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Administrative agencies are increasingly establishing voluntary self-reporting 
programs both as an investigative tool and to encourage regulated firms to commit 
to policing themselves.  We investigate whether self-reporting can reliably 
indicate effective self-policing efforts that might provide opportunities for 
enforcement efficiencies.  We find that regulators used self-reports of legal 
violations as a heuristic for identifying firms that are effectively policing their 
own operations, shifting enforcement resources away from voluntary disclosers.  
We also find that firms that voluntarily disclosed regulatory violations and 
committed to self-policing improved their regulatory compliance and 
environmental performance, suggesting that the enforcement relief they received 
was warranted.   Collectively, our results suggest that self-reporting can be a 
useful tool for reliably identifying and leveraging the voluntary self-policing 
efforts of regulated companies. 
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1. Introduction 
Administrative agencies have established, over the past two decades, self-reporting 
programs that mitigate penalties for companies that voluntarily disclose their legal violations.  
The U.S. Department of Defense-sponsored Contractor Disclosure Program reduces penalties 
for companies that self-report procurement fraud.  The Inspector General of the U.S. Health and 
Human Services Department administers the Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, a leniency 
program for voluntary disclosers of Medicare and Medicaid violations.  The U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Leniency Program relaxes sanctions against companies that self-report antitrust 
violations.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Audit Policy encourages the 
voluntary disclosure of environmental violations.  And the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission recently established guidelines for submitting Self-Reports admitting license 
violations. 
These programs provide regulators with valuable information about legal transgressions.  
The Department of Justice, for instance, characterizes its Leniency Program as its “most 
effective investigative tool,” claiming that “[c]ooperation from leniency applicants has cracked 
more cartels than all other tools at our disposal combined” (Hammond 2005).   Although such 
enforcement leverage is no doubt part of their appeal, most of these programs have much broader 
ambitions.  They seek to encourage not only self-reporting, but investment in self-policing 
practices, or internal efforts to monitor employees’ activities, that will pay dividends in improved 
future compliance.  The Defense Department’s Contractor Disclosure Program, for example, is 
explicitly designed “to encourage self-policing” (U.S. Department of Justice 1997). The Federal 
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Energy Regulatory Commission likewise looks beyond the immediate violation reported, 
observing that “self-reports also detail the steps taken to cure the violation and to prevent any 
recurrence” (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 2007: 18).  Similarly, the stated objectives 
of the EPA’s Audit Policy include encouraging “corporate compliance programs that are 
successful in preventing violations [and] improving environmental performance” and helping to 
“enhance protection of human health and the environment” (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 1995: 66706, 66712). And the Department of Health and Human Services describes its 
self-reporting program as seeking to “promote a higher level of ethical and lawful conduct 
throughout the health care industry” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Health 
Resources and Services Administration 1998: 58399).  
Such ambitions appear lofty, especially at a time when the self-regulatory capacities of 
corporations have been exposed as woefully inadequate in so many arenas.  In the wake of major 
bank failures and a broader financial meltdown, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
eliminated its voluntary supervision program for investment banks, with Chairman Christopher 
Cox noting:  “The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does 
not work” (Labaton 2008: A1). Similarly, the EPA recently shut down Performance Track, its 
flagship voluntary program, after media reports charged that the program was nothing more than 
a “public relations charade” (Shiffman, Sullivan and Avril 2009: A1). Academic research 
likewise suggests a cautious approach to self-regulation, with most studies finding no evidence 
that self-regulation programs improve regulatory compliance (Ebenshade 2004; Pirrong 2000; 
Pirrong 1995; Vidovic and Khanna 2007; Welch, Mazur and Bretschneider 2000) and some 
documenting worse performance by firms purporting to engage in self-regulation than by those 
not making such claims (King and Lenox 2000; Rivera, de Leon and Koerber 2006). 
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This article investigates whether the mechanism of coupling voluntary self-reporting with 
a commitment to self-police can overcome some of the demonstrated limitations of other 
voluntary regulation approaches.  Specifically, we ask whether voluntary disclosure of self-
detected compliance violations can reliably indicate to regulators effective self-policing efforts 
which might warrant a reduction in regulatory scrutiny of the disclosers.  These questions lie at 
the nexus of theories of self-reporting, self-policing, regulatory enforcement, and information 
disclosure.  We extend these bodies of literature by theorizing and empirically testing the 
relationship between self-reporting and self-policing.  
We analyze these questions in the empirical context of the EPA’s Audit Policy, a self-
reporting program which offers penalty mitigation to regulated entities that voluntarily disclose 
legal violations discovered through systematic self-policing, and in the enforcement context of 
the U.S. Clean Air Act, one of the most widely applicable federal environmental statutes.  First, 
we ask whether regulators actually use self-reports of legal violations as a heuristic for 
identifying firms that are effectively policing their own operations, shifting enforcement 
resources away from voluntary disclosers.  We then investigate whether such enforcement relief 
would be warranted, based on self-reporters’ subsequent regulatory compliance and 
environmental performance. We find that regulators reduced their scrutiny over self-reporting 
facilities, which suggests that regulators used these voluntary disclosures as an indicator that 
facilities were engaging in self-policing activities.  The agency subsequently reduced both the 
frequency and probability of inspections of voluntary disclosers relative to inspection rates at 
similarly situated, non-disclosing facilities.  We further demonstrate that firms that voluntarily 
disclosed regulatory violations and committed to self-policing improved their regulatory 
compliance and environmental performance. Specifically, they were subsequently cited for fewer 
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regulatory violations by agency inspectors and subsequently experienced fewer accidental 
releases of toxic chemicals than a matched set of non-disclosers.  These results suggest that, on 
average, self-reporters to the Audit Policy also engaged in effective self-policing.  Collectively, 
our results suggest that self-reporting can be a useful tool for reliably identifying and leveraging 
the voluntary self-policing efforts of regulated companies.  
 
2. Literature Review:  Self-Reporting and Self-Policing 
Despite a great deal of economic scholarship on both self-reporting and self-policing, 
these issues generally have been addressed separately and neither has been empirically linked to 
regulatory outcomes.  Several economic models have been developed that illustrate how 
regulatory schemes can be designed such that voluntary self-reporting enhances enforcement 
efficiency.  Kaplow and Shavell (1994: 593), for instance, show that, “given any enforcement 
scheme...without self-reporting, there exists a scheme with self-reporting under which behavior 
is the same but enforcement costs are lower.”  In their model, voluntary self-reporting reduces 
enforcement costs because regulators need not expend resources to catch those who confess.  
This extension of Becker’s (1968) probabilistic enforcement model allows regulators to maintain 
a given level of deterrence while decreasing inspection rates.  Various extensions of the Kaplow 
and Shavell (1994) model demonstrate that self-reporting can also enhance social welfare by 
eliminating the costs self-reporters might otherwise incur to evade detection of (and resulting 
punishments for) legal violations (Innes 2001a; Innes 2001b) and by ensuring that self-reported 
violations will be remediated (Innes 1999). 
A parallel body of scholarship focuses on how firm-level self-policing can contribute to 
overall deterrence levels.  Arlen (1994) and Arlen and Kraakman (1997) generate the key insight 
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that the deterrence of harmful acts is a function not only of government enforcement efforts, but 
also of firms’ internal efforts to monitor their employees’ activities, or to “self-police.”  They 
argue that, although company managers are often better positioned than the government to 
prevent and detect legal violations perpetrated by their employees, the prevailing structure of 
corporate criminal liability dampens their incentives to do so, resulting in less-than-optimal 
deterrence of corporate criminal conduct (Arlen and Kraakman 1997).  This view holds that 
optimal deterrence depends on properly calibrating the internal and external tiers of enforcement 
activity.  Arlen and Kraakman (1997) suggest that the magnitude and applicability of criminal 
sanctions should be designed to encourage corporate investments in self-policing.  Pfaff and 
Sanchirico (2000) apply this insight in the regulatory context, noting that self-auditing can be 
more comprehensive and efficient than periodic regulatory inspections, and arguing that 
regulators should adjust fines to encourage the practice. 
Although this scholarship identifies some important dynamics that underlie self-reporting 
and self-policing, the two practices remain largely distinct in the literature and their connection 
to improving compliance or reducing harm is unclear.  For example, Kaplow and Shavell’s 
(1994) foundational model of self-reporting does not address, and its results do not depend on, 
the existence or effectiveness of self-policing at self-reporting firms.  The efficiency gains 
identified in this model derive solely from the reduction in enforcement costs realized when 
firms self-report and thus remove themselves from the pool of firms the regulator must 
investigate.  Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) look beyond self-reporting to the importance of 
encouraging self-policing by regulated companies, but  the enforcement efficiencies they identify 
are also achieved via regulators’ enhanced detection capabilities.  They argue that internal 
investigations associated with self-policing create paper trails that facilitate regulators’ 
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investigations.  Accordingly, like Kaplow and Shavell (1994), their models avoid the question of 
whether self-policing can encourage firms to proactively remedy problems or deter harmful 
conduct.     
Unfortunately, the kinds of enforcement efficiencies theorized for self-reporting can be 
difficult to realize in practice.  Short and Toffel (2008) demonstrate that facilities “voluntarily” 
self-reported violations and committed to self-policing only after regulators had invested a 
disproportionate amount of enforcement resources to inspect and prosecute them, potentially 
cannibalizing any ex post gains that might be realized.  Moreover, even ex post gains can be 
elusive in a complex regulatory state, where legal violations are often chronic and result from 
either technological or compliance management deficiencies.  Merely reporting such lapses does 
not necessarily mean the problem has been remedied, so regulators cannot automatically remove 
self-reporters from the pool of firms to be monitored, as the police can do, for instance, when a 
suspect confesses to murder in the criminal context.  For these reasons, it is important to 
investigate the internal deterrent effects of self-policing as an alternative mechanism for 
economizing enforcement resources while maintaining overall deterrence levels in the regulatory 
context.   
Leveraging deterrence gains from firm-level self-policing efforts has been challenging 
both because there is wide variation in firms’ motivations and capacities to police themselves 
and because regulators cannot readily observe self-policing behavior to assess it for themselves.  
While some research on voluntary regulation has suggested that firms can reduce the harmful 
effects of their activities by adopting internal compliance management practices (Innes and Sam 
2008; Khanna and Damon 1999; Sam, Khanna and Innes 2009), other studies suggest that, on 
average, purportedly self-regulating firms do not measurably improve their performance 
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(Alberini and Segerson 2002; Darnall and Sides 2008; Ebenshade 2004; Koehler 2007; Lyon and 
Maxwell 2007; Pirrong 2000; Pirrong 1995; Rivera, de Leon and Koerber 2006; Vidovic and 
Khanna 2007; Welch, Mazur and Bretschneider 2000) and sometimes actually perform worse 
than their non-self-regulating counterparts (King and Lenox 2000; Rivera, de Leon and Koerber 
2006).  Because firms’ internal self-policing practices are not readily observable, regulators may 
not be able to distinguish effective from ineffective self-policers.  This has made it exceedingly 
difficult for regulators to leverage the effective self-policing achieved by some firms toward 
broader enforcement efficiencies.   
In this article, we theorize and test whether and how self-reporting might serve as an 
indication of effective self-policing—as evidenced by improved regulatory compliance and 
performance outcomes—that would create possibilities either for enhanced deterrence or the 
economization of enforcement resources.  To our knowledge, this is a novel undertaking.  The 
phenomenon of self-reporting is virtually absent from the literature on voluntary regulation.  
Arlen (1994) and Arlen and Kraakman (1997) highlight the potential deterrence gains from 
effective self-policing, but do not address how to identify effective self-policers in a way that 
would enable agencies to target enforcement resources effectively and leverage these deterrence 
gains in a complex regulatory scheme. Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) suggest that self-reporting 
can serve as a proxy for self-policing, but they neither theorize nor test whether this self-
reporting conveys information about the effectiveness of self-policing.  A few studies have 
investigated how regulatory regimes can optimally leverage self-policing and self-reporting to 
deter non-compliance and maximize aggregate social welfare (Friesen 2006; Innes 2001a). These 
studies have not, however, considered whether or how self-reporting and self-policing might be 
related within particular organizations.  Understanding these relationships is critically important 
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to the success of contemporary regulatory regimes that increasingly rely on multi-stakeholder 
and mixed public-private strategies to achieve regulatory goals.        
3. Empirical Context:  The EPA Audit Policy 
The EPA’s “Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Correction and Prevention of 
Violations” (Audit Policy) is the empirical setting for our research.  On its face, the Audit Policy 
program, launched in 1995, reduces or waives certain penalties for environmental violations that 
are voluntarily disclosed to the government by regulated entities.  We refer to these Audit Policy 
disclosures interchangeably as “voluntary disclosures” or “self-reports.”  But the EPA’s 
ambitions for the Audit Policy go beyond investigative leverage.  Ultimately, the agency’s 
objective is to encourage the adoption of “corporate compliance programs that are successful in 
preventing violations [and] improving environmental performance” and helping to “enhance 
protection of human health and the environment” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1995: 
66710-66712).   
The program is designed to achieve this by conditioning penalty mitigation on disclosers’ 
representations of their past and future auditing practices.  Like other self-reporting policies and 
more traditional amnesty programs, the Audit Policy requires prompt and voluntary disclosure 
and remediation of the violation.1 In addition, however, the Audit Policy requires that voluntary 
disclosures arise from the “[s]ystematic discovery of the violation through an environmental 
                                                 
1 The Audit Policy provides the following conditions for full penalty mitigation and an EPA recommendation of no criminal 
prosecution: “Systematic discovery of the violation through an environmental audit or the implementation of a compliance 
management system; Voluntary discovery of the violation was not detected as a result of a legally required monitoring, sampling 
or auditing procedure; Prompt disclosure in writing to EPA within 21 days of discovery…; Independent discovery and disclosure 
before EPA or another regulator would likely have identified the violation through its own investigation or based on information 
provided by a third-party; Correction and remediation within 60 calendar days, in most cases, from the date of discovery; Prevent 
recurrence of the violation; [Violations of] specific terms of an administrative or judicial order or consent agreement [are 
ineligible]; Cooperation by the disclosing entity is required” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2009). The Audit Policy 
does not, however, permit the agency to mitigate the “economic benefit” portion of the penalty, which recoups any financial 
gains the company might have accrued by violating the law.    
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audit or the implementation of a compliance management system” and requires self-reporters to 
make assurances that they will “prevent recurrence of the violation” (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 2009). In these ways, the Audit Policy program explicitly links self-reporting 
to self-policing.2   
Our study investigates the assumptions that underlie this regulatory design.  Specifically, 
we examine (a) whether claims of self-policing made in connection with Audit Policy disclosures 
prompt regulators to re-target their enforcement resources; and (b) whether self-reporters who 
claim to be self-policing actually improve their regulatory compliance and performance 
outcomes.  This significantly extends existing research on the Audit Policy that has addressed the 
types of violations that are voluntarily reported (Pfaff and Sanchirico 2004), the way the EPA’s 
adoption of the Audit Policy has altered aggregate enforcement and compliance patterns 
(Stafford 2004), and the factors that predict self-reporting (Short and Toffel 2008; Stretesky and 
Gabriel 2005).   
4. Hypotheses 
Our empirical analysis investigates two questions.  First, we examine whether regulators 
use voluntary disclosures as a heuristic for targeting their enforcement resources.  We suggest 
that regulators will shift inspection resources away from self-reporting facilities in the belief that 
these facilities are effectively policing themselves.  Second, we test whether there is any warrant 
for doing so.  Specifically, we investigate whether facilities that “come clean” by self-reporting a 
                                                 
2  By 1999, the EPA had received Audit Policy disclosures of compliance violations pertaining to nearly 2000 facilities, and 
while EPA was “encouraged by the growing trend in corporate-wide disclosures under our Audit Policy” (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 1999a: 2), it is important to consider this figure in the context of traditional enforcement mechanisms. For 
example, in 1999, EPA and state environmental regulators conducted more than 500,000 compliance inspections, issued more 
than 40,000 notices of violations, and filed nearly 12,000 formal administrative actions (Brown and Green 2001; U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 2002). 
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violation and commit to self-policing under the conditions of the Audit Policy actually “clean up 
their act” more broadly and improve their overall regulatory compliance and performance.  We 
suggest here that, under certain conditions, voluntary disclosures can reliably indicate effective 
self-policing practices.       
4.1  Assessing the Regulator’s Response to Self-Reports 
In this section, we investigate how regulators respond to self-reports.  For a number of 
reasons, we expect regulators to reduce their scrutiny of self-reporters.  First, economic models 
locate the efficiency gains of self-reporting in the fact that the enforcer need not investigate 
companies that self-report violations (Friesen 2006; Kaplow and Shavell 1994).  Even in the 
regulatory context, where violations are often ongoing, regulators may be eager to reallocate 
limited enforcement resources away from self-reporters and toward seemingly less cooperative 
facilities, and/or to reduce agency costs by inspecting fewer facilities.  Second, an extensive 
literature on “responsive regulation” suggests that the kind of cooperative regulatory 
relationships that underpin mixed public-private regulatory regimes are most likely to develop 
when regulators engage in a “tit-for-tat” strategy, rewarding the cooperative behavior of 
regulated facilities and using more punitive enforcement tools only when a regulated facility 
defects (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Maxwell and Decker 2006; Scholz 1984).  Inspection relief 
is a key strategy for rewarding voluntary disclosers, building trust and responsibility, and 
encouraging cooperative behavior.  Indeed, many have argued that facilities are motivated to 
self-report violations to regulators by the prospect that voluntary disclosures will demonstrate 
cooperation and thus ease regulatory scrutiny (Helland 1998; Pfaff and Sanchirico 2000; Short 
and Toffel 2008), and some have argued that regulators should credibly commit to easing 
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regulatory scrutiny in order to incentivize self-regulatory behavior (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; 
Maxwell and Decker 2006).   
A number of voluntary regulatory programs are designed with these arguments in mind.  
Programs such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Point and the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Voluntary Protection 
Program, for instance, expressly provide that the agency will decrease inspection activity at 
participating firms (Chelius and Stark 1984).  Similarly, when the EPA launched its 
Environmental Leadership Program, designed to strengthen corporations’ internal environmental 
management practices, the agency “promise[d] not to perform routine inspections during the 
pilot period” (Orts and Murray 1997: 20).   
By contrast, the EPA has been unwilling to commit to providing such a quid pro quo for 
Audit Policy disclosers.   In fact, it has adopted the formal stance that “[a]uditing does not in any 
way serve as a substitute for compliance activities, nor does it replace regulatory agency 
inspections” (Johnson and Frey 2000: 4) and the agency’s Office of Enforcement Policy has 
noted that, irrespective of self-policing efforts, “inspections play a major role in assuring quality 
and lending credibility to self-monitoring programs” (Wasserman 1990: 17).3   
Although the EPA acknowledges that the Audit Policy can only elicit voluntary 
disclosures if it avoids the impression that self-reporting will attract increased regulatory 
scrutiny,4 there are at least two reasons why the agency might not offer an explicit quid pro quo.  
                                                 
3 For example, the EPA noted in 1997 that “EPA’s longstanding policy is not to agree to limit its non-penalty enforcement 
authorities as a provision of settlement or otherwise.  While EPA may consider such a facility to be a lower inspection priority 
than a facility that is not known to be auditing, whether and when to conduct an inspection does, and should, remain a matter of 
Agency discretion” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1997: vi).  Also, the EPA’s Regional Council noted that, “While 
EPA inspections of self-audited facilities will continue, to the extent that compliance performance is considered in setting 
inspection priorities, facilities with a good compliance history may be subject to fewer inspections” (Johnson and Frey 2000: 5). 
4 In a conversation with one of the authors, an EPA program administrator noted that “[t]he Agency has to avoid the perception 
that it is picking on companies who participate in the Audit Policy” (Personal communication, March 16, 2004). 
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First, structured interviews and informal conversations with EPA staff revealed that the agency 
might want to maintain the flexibility to inspect particular disclosers as it sees fit, because many 
regulators see voluntary disclosures as red flags indicating that self-reporting facilities might be 
concealing bigger problems.5  Second, providing concrete benefits to regulated firms in exchange 
for implementing compliance measures that are not required by law increases the risk that the 
program will be subjected to heightened administrative procedural requirements and judicial 
oversight.6  An enforcement program that is more coy about how it will target and reward 
regulated entities can be promulgated through more informal procedures and shielded both from 
public notice and comment and from judicial review (Lobel 2005; Sparrow 2000).  We test 
whether, despite its equivocation, the EPA does, in fact, grant inspection relief to voluntary 
disclosers, generating greater opportunities for enforcement efficiencies, targeting leverage, and 
regulatory cooperation. 
4.2  Assessing Voluntary Disclosers’ Commitment to Self-Police 
We next examine whether there is any warrant for granting enforcement relief to self-
reporters, based on their subsequent compliance performance.  We suggest that, in this context, 
there is reason to believe that self-reporting will be a reliable indicator of effective firm-level 
self-policing that would justify inspection relief, because the disclosure of legal violations is a 
                                                 
5 In a conversation with one of the authors, a former EPA attorney said that the agency tended to regard Audit Policy disclosures 
as a “red flag” that warranted increased scrutiny (Personal communication, June 10, 2004).  Our conversations with EPA 
inspectors yielded mixed impressions: One inspector said she would be less suspicious of firms that self-disclosed, another 
inspector that he would be more suspicious, noting, “if a facility makes a mistake in one area, it is probably making mistakes in 
other areas” (Personal communication, October 12, 2007).  See also discussion, infra, at p. 16.  
6 The Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently struck down OSHA’s Cooperative Compliance Program, 
which sought to induce facilities to enter into agreements to police themselves in exchange for reduced scrutiny, stating that non-
cooperators would be higher priority targets for inspection.  The decision was based, in part, on the fact that the agency sought to 
use its inspection targeting practices to induce regulated facilities to adopt compliance programs that were not required by law.  
The court argued that this approach altered the rights and interests of regulated parties and thus required the agency to vet the 
policy through onerous Administrative Procedure Act notice and comment rulemaking procedures.   
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risky and potentially costly act, especially for firms that cannot live up to the associated self-
policing commitments.   
Companies have gone to great lengths in recent years to communicate to regulators and 
the broader public their commitment to police themselves by adopting codes of conduct, 
establishing internal compliance offices, or joining industry- or agency-sponsored voluntary 
programs (King, Lenox and Barnett 2002; King and Toffel 2009).  It is far from clear, however, 
whether any of these activities reliably identifies firms that have actually implemented effective 
internal self-policing practices (Darnall and Carmin 2005).  Outward indicators of self-regulation 
typically impose minimal costs on the firms that adopt them (Darnall and Sides 2008; Lyon and 
Maxwell 2007).  Voluntary program design has focused on reducing costs to attract participants, 
but less attention has been paid to the incentives necessary to promote meaningful corporate 
harm reduction.  Consequently, the fact that a firm adopts some form of voluntary regulation 
reveals little about whether it is likely to follow through with the associated commitments.  
Indeed, some have argued that self-regulation has been primarily a vehicle for self-promotion 
(Bruno 1992; Krut and Gleckman 1998; Lyon and Maxwell forthcoming; Rhodes 2007) and 
regulation avoidance (King and Lenox 2000; Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 2000).  Most self-
regulatory programs have therefore been poor proxies for good compliance behavior.   
However, voluntary regulation programs have been consistently associated with 
meaningful self-policing under circumstances where they impose costs on those that fail to 
implement their commitment to internally deterring harmful behavior.  These costs have been 
built into self-regulatory schemes in different ways; for instance, by requiring third-party 
certifications of self-policing quality and denying certification to firms that fail to maintain 
robust self-policing practices (Potoski and Prakash 2005; Toffel 2006; Weil 2005) and by 
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imposing more stringent government regulation on those that fail to regulate themselves 
effectively (Innes and Sam 2008; Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 2000). 
We argue that the Audit Policy similarly makes representations of self-policing more 
credible by making them more costly, especially for those who would misrepresent their self-
policing intentions or capacity.  Unlike many other common indicators of self-policing, the 
voluntary disclosure of regulatory violations is associated with three kinds of costs.  First, there 
are monetary costs associated with voluntary disclosures that are arguably greater than the 
expected costs of hiding the violations.  These include the cost of implementing and maintaining 
the systematic internal monitoring process that is the policy’s prerequisite, the cost of 
remediating the violation, and, often, the cost (albeit discounted) of fines imposed with certainty.  
As Innes (2001b: 253) notes, “in practice, self-reporting firms have been subject to rather large 
monetary sanctions.”  Not every firm will be willing to incur these costs.  Second, revealing 
illegal actions has the potential to damage a firm’s reputation, both with the regulator and with 
the public.  As mentioned above, regulators sometimes view voluntary disclosures as “red flags,” 
indicating more serious wrongdoing.  And firms’ voluntary disclosures are publicly available, so 
business partners, customers, and shareholders may become aware of wrongdoing that the firm 
otherwise could have concealed.   Finally, disclosing a violation to the regulator creates a risk of 
greater future litigation costs.  Because no federal audit privilege protects voluntary disclosers, 
self-reports and the audit materials that support them can invite citizen suits that would impose 
costs far beyond those directly associated with voluntary disclosure, especially where private 
attorneys general suspect that the discloser has not cleaned up its act.     
These risks are much greater for firms that would game the system than for firms that 
wish to communicate, through their disclosures, a genuine commitment to self-policing.  A 
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facility that is truly a poor complier, and whose minimal compliance efforts are easily detectable 
under regulatory scrutiny, is much less likely to disclose a violation because doing so risks 
attracting attention and raising the suspicions of regulators, private attorneys general, and the 
general public.  Our interviews with regulators suggest that they are particularly wary of being 
duped by self-reporters.  One inspector reported that voluntary disclosures can raise a “red flag,” 
but “[o]nly if they self-disclose and they’re not meeting the requirements of their self disclosure” 
(Interview Transcript 4, 2009).  Another noted that the agency may punish firms more harshly 
when they misrepresent their self-policing efforts.  “If we go to a place that has voluntary 
programs and we find violations, we’re more likely to take enforcement.  If we find violations, 
it’s almost like they’re being dishonest in the voluntary program” (Interview Transcript 1, 2009).  
In this way, self-reporting stands in stark contrast to the many self-regulation symbols that 
merely provide a platform for self-promotion in that the voluntary disclosure of legal violations 
is arguably “too costly to fake” (Camerer 1988: S186). 
For these reasons, we hypothesize that, on average, companies that self-report violations 
to the Audit Policy will make meaningful investments in self-policing to deter harmful conduct 
by their employees.  To the extent that self-reporting facilities effectively implement their 
commitments to self-police, their environmental compliance and environmental performance 
should improve in a variety of ways (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2001).  As Orts and 
Murray (1997: 9) note: “First and foremost, environmental auditing informs a company of 
potential risks of violations and accidents.  Better knowledge of these risks encourages 
prevention.”  We hypothesize that voluntary disclosers will both commit fewer environmental 
regulatory violations and experience fewer environmental accidents than similarly situated, non-
disclosing facilities.   
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5. Data and Empirical Methods 
5.1  Sample and Measures 
We gathered data on facilities located across the United States that are subject to the U.S. 
Clean Air Act (CAA), a statute that applies to a wide range of industries and activities that emit 
air pollutants beyond regulatory thresholds. Our sample period of 1991 through 2003 reflects 
data availability, as explained below. 
Dependent variables. Our study employs three dependent variables.  First, we measure 
regulatory scrutiny as the annual number of CAA inspections to which each facility has been 
subjected.  We calculated this measure based on data from the Aerometric Information Retrieval 
System (AIRS) database. 7  
We use two dependent variables to assess the extent to which facilities are honoring their 
commitment to self-police. Specifically, we examine regulatory inspection records as recorded 
by a third-party, and abnormal releases of toxic chemicals that facilities are required to self-
report to the regulator. Relying on these different metrics enables us to triangulate our results, 
and enhance the reliability of our empirical results (Campbell and Fiske 1959; Jick 1979).   
A key facility-level metric that should be enhanced by effective self-policing is the 
facility’s regulatory compliance record, a third-party assessment recorded by regulatory 
inspectors. To measure environmental compliance, we created clean inspection, a dichotomous 
variable that refers to a facility’s CAA regulatory inspection on a particular date.  This variable is 
coded “1” when the inspection resulted in no compliance violations (“clean”) and “0” when the 
                                                 
7 To avoid our results being driven by outliers, we recoded annual inspection tallies beyond 14, the 99.9th percentile, to 14 when 
using this count as a dependent variable.  We were even more conservative when using annual inspection tallies as a control 
variable, taking the additional precaution against large values being overly influential by recoding values beyond 8, the 99th 
percentile, to 8. 
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inspector cited the facility for a violation (“dirty”).  This distinction between whether or not 
inspections resulted in violations has been used in other empirical analyses of regulatory 
compliance (Gray and Scholz 1993; U.S. General Accounting Office 2001).  We obtained data 
on CAA inspections from 1991 through 2003 from the EPA’s AIRS/AIRS Facility Subsystem 
(AFS) database.   
Effective self-policing should also reduce the occurrences of abnormal operational events 
such as accidental releases of pollutants to the environment.  In contrast to regulatory inspections 
which are recorded by a third party, certain facilities face regulatory requirements to self-report 
accidental toxic chemicals releases to the EPA under penalty for misreporting or not reporting 
incidents.  We obtained data on these abnormal releases of toxic chemicals from the EPA’s 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database.  In this context, abnormal releases refer to toxic 
chemical emissions that result from circumstances outside of routine operations; for example, 
tank ruptures, vehicle accidents, or improperly maintained waste-pond berms (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 2007: 58).8  Interviews with state and federal regulators as 
well as company environmental managers suggested that self-policing can result in improved 
housekeeping and updated management plans, both of which can reduce the severity and 
frequency of environmental releases associated with such abnormal or accidental events.9  For 
example, ongoing auditing can help managers ensure that equipment is properly maintained and 
                                                 
8 Specifically, abnormal releases include all TRI chemicals “disposed or released directly into the environment or sent off-site for 
recycling, energy recovery, treatment, or disposal during the reporting year due to any of the following events: (1) remedial 
actions; (2) catastrophic events such as earthquakes, fires, or floods; or (3) abnormal events not associated with normal or routine 
production processes” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2007: 58).  Our calls to New Jersey environmental regulators and 
to the EPA confirmed that this definition was routinely provided to companies.  Calls to several companies that had reported 
abnormal releases confirmed that they used this definition in deciding what to report as abnormal releases. 
9 For example, an EPA Regional TRI coordinator told us that “Internal audits would likely set up systems that could prevent or 
mitigate abnormal releases.  They could establish procedures that would prevent or mitigate one-time releases.”  A regulator from 
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection told us that internal environmental audits could reduce the frequency of 
abnormal releases.  
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that staff members adhere to training schedules, both of which can prevent breakdowns and 
accidents.10  We calculated the annual number of abnormal releases from the subset of facilities 
in our sample that were required to report TRI data.11  
Independent variables. Our key explanatory variable is voluntarily disclosed, a 
dichotomous variable coded “1” for a self-reporting facility in the years after it voluntarily 
disclosed to the Audit Policy, and “0” beforehand.  For non-disclosers, this variable is always 
coded “0”.  We compiled data on voluntary disclosures associated with the EPA Audit Policy 
from the EPA Integrated Compliance Information System (ICIS) database, the EPA Audit Policy 
Docket, and lists of facilities that responded to various EPA Compliance Incentive Programs. 
The EPA provided these datasets in response to Freedom of Information Act requests.  
Control variables. We obtained data for two measures of facility size.  We gathered Dun 
& Bradstreet data on annual facility employment from the National Establishment Time-Series 
(NETS) Database. Because the number of abnormal releases might increase if production levels 
increase, we also obtained data, from the TRI database, on facilities’ annual production ratio 
values; that is, the ratio of a facility’s production level in the focal year to the prior year.12  
Because TRI-reporting facilities report production ratios for each chemical each year, we 
calculated the mean value for each facility-year.  We took a conservative approach to avoid 
                                                 
10 A regulator at the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection offered this example: “Above ground storage tanks 
must have a berm around them that is large enough to contain the substance held in the container should it rupture.  Making sure 
that these are maintained can prevent further discharge into the environment” (Personal communication, March 20, 2008).  
Similarly, an environmental manager at one of California’s largest manufacturing plants told us: “I definitely believe regular 
audits are necessary to ensure not just regulatory compliance, but also the integrity of a facility’s environmental safeguard.  The 
purpose of the audits should be to identify potential mechanical or operating gaps in a system.  Once identified, the facility can 
develop countermeasures or remedial actions to address any findings” (Personal communication, March 20, 2008). 
 
11 Facilities are required to report TRI data if they have at least 10 employees, operate in a targeted industry (such as 
manufacturers, utilities, mining), and produce or use any of the listed chemicals in quantities greater than particular thresholds 
(which range from 10 to 25,000 pounds) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2007: 1, 6). 
12 As we were unable to find data on actual production levels, we employ production ratios as a proxy.  
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undue influence from outliers, top-coding values at the 99.9th percentile for the entire sample 
distribution of mean production ratios.    
We gathered data on several factors that might affect facilities’ compliance behaviors and 
thus the likelihood of regulatory inspections resulting in violations.  From the AIRS database, we 
calculated each facility’s annual number of CAA inspections and violations.  We use one-year 
lagged values of these variables in our models.  
Finally, we gathered data on several factors that might affect a facility’s annual 
inspection frequency, considering both specific and general deterrence mechanisms (Cohen 
2000).13  We considered two measures of specific deterrence.  First, we calculated the number of 
years since the facility was last inspected for compliance with the CAA, based on data from the 
AIRS database.  Second, we created a dummy variable coded “1” when the facility was cited 
with at least one enforcement action and “0” otherwise, based on data from the EPA’s ICIS 
database.14 
We also obtained several measures of general deterrence.  Every two years, the EPA 
announces National Priority sectors to be targeted as nationwide enforcement priorities.  We 
coded National Priority sector as a dummy variable based on data from the EPA website.15  
Second, we created a dummy variable to identify facilities that were EPA Compliance Incentive 
Program targets based on data obtained from the agency via Freedom of Information Act 
requests.  These programs explicitly encourage facilities in particular EPA Regions or industries 
                                                 
13 According to deterrence theory, firms’ compliance behavior is influenced by both specific deterrence, “the fear engendered by 
the prior experience of being inspected, warned or penalized themselves,” and general deterrence, “hearing about legal sanctions 
against others” (Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan 2005: 263). 
14 Fewer than 2% of facilities with any enforcement actions had more than a single one in a particular year.  To avoid our results 
being driven by these outliers, we created a dummy variable (rather than a count variable) to measure whether a facility had been 
cited with any enforcement actions. 
15  The EPA’s National Priority sectors can be found at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/planning/shortterm.html.  
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or that conduct specific regulated activities to reexamine their compliance status regarding a 
particular regulatory issue and to self-report and correct any violations discovered.  Third, we 
created two annual state-level variables pertaining to CAA enforcement based on AIRS data: 
total CAA penalties assessed (in dollars) by environmental regulators and total number of CAA 
regulated facilities.   
5.2  Regulatory Scrutiny Model  
We estimate the following model to assess the effect that self-reporting a violation and 
committing to self-policing has on the number of regulatory inspections: 
 yi,t = f(DitXitSititttiit) (1) 
In this model, the unit of analysis is the facility-year.  The dependent variable yi,t refers to 
the annual number of CAA inspections to which facility i has been subjected in year t.  Our key 
explanatory variable is voluntarily disclosed (Di,t), which is coded as described earlier. 
We control for many potential determinants of inspections in Xi,t.  Several economic 
models suggest that regulators can bolster the effectiveness of limited enforcement budgets by 
targeting inspections based on facilities’ prior compliance records (Friesen 2003; Harrington 
1988).  In addition, the EPA notes that, given its limited resources, achieving compliance “is 
dependent on effective targeting of the most significant public health and environmental risks” 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1999b: 20).  This means targeting enforcement 
resources at not only the most pressing problem areas, but also the firms most likely to be 
creating problems, “taking into account…compliance/enforcement history” (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 1999b: 20).  Indeed, EPA policy suggests that facilities found in violation are 
often targeted for more frequent inspections in the near future (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 1990), a relationship supported by empirical evidence (Harrington 1988; Helland 1998).  
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We thus include the annual number of CAA violations for which a facility was cited and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the facility was subjected to an enforcement action, each 
lagged one and two years.  
Because regulators may attempt to ensure that they return to inspect facilities before a 
certain time lag occurs, we include a series of dummy variables to denote the number of years 
since the facility was last subjected to a CAA inspection.  Specifically, we include three dummy 
variables to denote 2, 3, and 4 and more years since a facility’s last CAA inspection. 
We control for regulatory programs that might affect inspection rates by including 
dummy variables that indicate whether, in a given year, a facility was targeted for heightened 
inspector scrutiny via an EPA Compliance Incentive Program or an EPA National Priority sector.  
We control for variation in enforcement strategies within states over time by including the log of 
total penalties assessed by environmental regulators and the log of total regulated facilities in 
each state-year (Si,t). 
We include a full set of dummies (i,t) to control for the number of years before or after 
the match year (matching is explained below).  We also include a full set of year dummies (t) to 
control for year-specific factors, such as changes in presidential administration, Congress, and 
EPA leadership, that might affect inspection rates.  We include conditional fixed effects (i) at 
the facility level to control for all time-invariant factors, such as EPA Region and state regulatory 
authorities, year of construction, industry, proximity to the inspection agency, and affluence of 
the facility’s community, that might influence a facility’s inspection rate (Helland 1998).  
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5.3  Regulatory Compliance Record Model  
To evaluate the effect that self-reporting a violation and committing to self-policing has 
on regulatory compliance records, we pursued the approach of other evaluations of self-
regulatory programs (Gawande and Bohara 2005; King and Lenox 2000; Lenox 2006).  We 
estimate the following model using the individual inspection as our unit of analysis: 
 yi,d = fDi,dXi,ti,tt + i,tii,d) (2) 
In contrast to the preceding model, the unit of analysis in this model is a facility’s 
regulatory inspection on a particular date.  The dependent variable yi,d is our clean inspection 
dichotomous variable that refers to facility i’s regulatory inspection on date d.  The coefficient on 
voluntarily disclosed (Di,d) is our estimate of the change in the probability that a facility’s 
inspection was clean following its self-report and accompanying commitment to self-police 
under the Audit Policy, compared to the probability for matched non-disclosing facilities over the 
same time period.  
We control for several factors that can affect a facility’s compliance rate.  We include in 
Xi,t the number of inspections and violations a facility experienced during each of the prior two 
years because a facility’s recent regulatory experience can affect its subsequent compliance 
(Gray and Deily 1996; Gray and Jones 1991; Gunningham, Thornton and Kagan 2005; Helland 
1998; Magat and Viscusi 1990; Olson 1999; Shimshack and Ward 2005; Weil 1996). 
Because the perceived likelihood of being inspected can also affect compliance behavior 
(Laplante and Rilstone 1996; Shimshack and Ward 2005), we control for the predicted 
probability of being inspected (Ii,t) (Earnhart 2004; Eckert 2004; Gray and Deily 1996; Laplante 
and Rilstone 1996).  We estimate a facility’s probability of being inspected at least once in a 
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given year using the predicted value from the inspection model specified above as Equation (1) 
but estimated using pooled logistic regression.16  
We include facility-level conditional fixed effects (i) to control for all time-invariant 
factors, such as the facility’s year of construction, EPA Region and state regulatory authorities, 
industry, proximity to the regulatory inspector, and the political power and demographic 
characteristics of its local community, that might affect a facility’s violation rate (Delmas and 
Toffel 2008; Gawande and Bohara 2005; Gray and Deily 1996; Helland 1998; Lynch, Stretesky 
and Burns 2004; Shimshack and Ward 2005).  As with Equation (1), we also include as control 
variables a full set of dummies indicating the number of years before or after the match year (i,t) 
and a full set of dummies to denote years (t).  
5.4  Abnormal Environmental Releases Model 
To assess the effect that self-reporting a violation and committing to self-police have on 
environmental performance, we estimate the following model: 
 yi,t = f(DitXiti,ttiit) (3) 
In this model, the unit of analysis is the facility-year.  The dependent variable yi,t refers to 
the annual number of abnormal releases by facility i in year t.  Our key explanatory variable is 
voluntarily disclosed (Di,t). 
Because changes in facility size and production quantities may affect the number of 
abnormal releases, Xi,t includes log employment and log production ratio.17  We also include a 
full set of dummies (i,t) to control for the number of years before or after the match year.  We 
                                                 
16 We use pooled logistic regression here to generate predicted probabilities because the conditional fixed-effects logit model 
does not yield predicted probabilities that incorporate the fixed effects. 
17 Our results were unchanged when we estimated models that omitted these two control variables. 
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include a full set of year dummies (t) to control for year-specific factors, such as the emergence 
of new technologies, that might affect the number of abnormal releases.  We include facility-
level conditional fixed effects (i) to control for all unobserved time-invariant factors, such as 
industry, geographic location, EPA Region and state regulatory authorities, proximity to 
inspection agencies, and political power of its community, that might influence a facility’s 
abnormal releases.  
5.5  Matched Sample 
The three models described above employ a difference-in-differences approach whereby 
we compare changes in the number of regulatory inspections, the probability that a regulatory 
inspection yields no compliance violations, and the number of abnormal releases among self-
reporting (voluntary disclosing) facilities relative to those of a matched set of control facilities.  
This method permits each facility to have its own baseline level for each outcome.  To ensure a 
valid comparison, we developed a matched control group against which to estimate an average 
treatment effect using a difference-in-differences specification with panel data, a robust 
technique used in other recent program evaluations (Blundell and Costa Dias 2002; Galiani, 
Gertler and Schargrodsky 2005; Greenaway, Gullstrand and Kneller 2005; Huttunen 2007; Qian 
2007; Villalonga 2004).  
The decision to disclose compliance violations to the Audit Policy is voluntary, yet the 
identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences approach we employ is that non-
participants and participants would have experienced the same regulatory stringency, 
compliance, and pollution behavioral trends in the absence of program enrollment, after 
controlling for observables.  Unable to identify suitable instrumental variables, we turn to 
matching, the other main approach to generating unbiased estimates of a program’s effect when 
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participation is voluntary (endogenous).  Our objective is to compare disclosing facilities to a 
matched set of non-disclosers that look “similar” to them in the years prior to voluntary 
disclosure.  We do this based on the logic that a matched group of disclosers and non-disclosers 
that look similar before voluntary disclosure occurs would have continued to look similar in the 
ensuing years had voluntary disclosure not occurred.  In developing a matched sample, we seek 
to replicate a randomized experiment that compares “treated” and “control” facilities that do not 
differ systematically from each other at the time the treatment occurs (Shadish, Cook and 
Campbell 2002), which in our case is when voluntary disclosure occurs.  Relying on matched 
samples has been shown to significantly reduce bias in program evaluation (Blundell and Costa 
Dias 2000; Smith and Todd 2005).  
To develop our matched sample, we implement case-control matching based on several 
factors which empirical studies have shown to be associated with facilities’ decision to 
voluntarily disclose to the Audit Policy (Short and Toffel 2008; Stafford 2007; Stretesky and 
Gabriel 2005).  We consider for each voluntary discloser its industry (3-digit SIC code) and its 
annual inspections, violations, and enforcement actions during each of the two years before it 
disclosed.  We include as its matched controls those non-disclosing facilities that match it 
exactly along all seven dimensions.18  We refer to the voluntary disclosure year as the “match 
year” for this “matched group” of facilities. We repeat this process for all voluntary disclosers.  
We omit from the matched sample any voluntary discloser for which no matches were available 
and all non-disclosers that went unmatched.   
                                                 
18 Specifically, the matching criteria include each of the following facility-level measures: (1) industry as measured by its 3-digit 
SIC code; (2) number of CAA inspections in the prior (calendar) year; (3) number of CAA inspections in the year two years 
prior; (4) number of CAA violations in the prior year; (5) number of CAA violations in the year two years prior; (6) a dummy 
coded “1” if the facility faced any enforcement actions in the prior year; and (7) a dummy coded “1” if the facility faced any 
enforcement actions in the year two years prior.  For self-disclosing facilities, we use the year a facility self-disclosed to the Audit 
Policy as the year from which to calculate the one- and two-year lags.  For non-disclosing facilities, we calculate these factors for 
all years.  
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Our matching process resulted in our discarding many facilities for which matches could 
not be identified. This substantially increased the proportion of disclosing facilities (treatments) 
in our matched sample because matching led us to discard many more potential controls than 
treatments. Matching resulted in an overall matched sample of 19,986 facilities, including 688 
that voluntarily disclosed violations.  Our analysis includes each matched facility’s observations 
starting two years before its match year through five years after the match year. 
In our analysis, we focused on facilities’ initial disclosure and considered a facility to be 
a treatment facility in that year and in all subsequent years. We believe this to be a reasonable 
way to consider treatment in our context, since 70% of the facilities that voluntarily disclosed to 
the Audit Policy did so only once and, of those that disclosed more than once, the vast majority 
(approximately 90%) did so only twice, with repeat disclosures averaging only 1.4 years apart. 
Although we match on the determinants of self-disclosing that have been identified in the 
prior literature, include in our regressions specifications several factors that affect the outcome 
variables, and rely on facility-level fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservables, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that time-variant unobservables might influence our results.  
However, our models that predict organizational outcomes are associational, not causal: the 
reductions in compliance violations and abnormal environmental releases are caused not by the 
self-disclosures that we model, but rather by the unobserved self-policing (internal auditing) for 
which we take the disclosures to be an indication. Unobservable differences should therefore not 
generate biased estimates of the association between disclosures and these outcomes.  In 
contrast, our regulatory scrutiny model is a causal model that predicts that regulators will 
respond directly to Audit Policy disclosures under the assumption that they indicate internal 
auditing. Consequently, as with any evaluation that draws causal inferences based on difference-
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in-differences regression on a sample matched on observables, our regulatory scrutiny results 
should be interpreted with the caveat of the identifying assumption that time-variant 
unobservables are not correlated with both disclosing and regulatory scrutiny. 
 
6. Results 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.  We report the results of our regressions 
that predict outcomes recorded by the regulator (inspection frequency and clean inspections), 
followed by the results of our regressions that predict self-reported outcomes (abnormal releases) 
in Tables 2-4. All specifications include facility fixed effects, with standard errors calculated 
using block bootstrap with 500 replications.19 Although we also report results from the entire 
sample for comparison purposes, we rely on results from the matched sample as the basis of our 
interpretation and inferences, noting that in most cases both samples yield similar coefficient 
estimates and confidence intervals (see Table 5). 
6.1  Regulatory Scrutiny   
We employed conditional fixed-effects logistic regression to analyze whether the 
probability of a facility experiencing any inspections in a given year declined after voluntarily 
disclosing a violation and committing to self-policing.  We employed conditional fixed-effects 
negative binomial regression to estimate whether these facilities’ annual number of inspections 
declined.  The results for both models are consistent and indicate that regulators granted 
                                                 
19 Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) highlight the potential for serial correlation to lead to seriously underestimated 
standard errors in difference-in-differences specifications.  They find that calculating standard errors using block bootstrap 
provides a reliable solution when the number of groups is large, as it is in our context.  
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inspection holidays to facilities that voluntarily disclosed and committed to self-policing (Table 
2).   
The results of the conditional fixed-effects logistic model reported in Column 2 of Table 
2 indicate that facilities that self-reported subsequently experienced a 26% decline in the 
probability of facing any inspections compared to the matched controls (=-0.30; p<0.01; 
OR=0.74). To put this result into context, this refers to a seven-percentage-point decrease in the 
probability of an inspection from the 37% baseline to 30%.20   
The negative binomial results reported in Column 4 of Table 2 indicate that after facilities 
voluntarily disclosed, the annual number of inspections declined by 17% (=-0.19; p<0.01; 
IRR=0.83).  This effect corresponds to a decrease in the number of annual inspections during the 
two-year period prior to the match year from the 0.50 baseline to 0.42 (calculated as IRR  
baseline rate, or 0.83  0.50). In other words, on average, 100 disclosing facilities would be 
subjected to a total of 40 fewer inspections over a five-year period (calculated as a 0.08 decrease 
in inspections per facility-year  100 facilities  5 years).   
6.1.1. Robustness Tests 
Our conditional fixed-effects logistic regression results were nearly identical when, 
instead of using block bootstrap, we clustered standard errors by facility. Our conditional fixed-
effects negative binomial regression results were nearly identical to results from our estimated 
this model using a conditional fixed-effects Poisson regression with robust standard errors 
clustered by facility. 
                                                 
20 The 37% figure refers to the mean of the dependent variable in this matched sample during the two years prior to the match 
year (0.37). The 30% figure corresponds to the probability (p) is calculated based on odds () and odds ratio (OR) as follows. 
First, convert the baseline probability of 0.37 to a baseline odds as =p/(1-p) = 0.37 / (1-0.37) = 0.5873. Second, multiply the 
result by the odds ratio estimate as   OR = 0.5873  0.74 = 0.4346. Third, convert the result to a probability as  = p/(1-p) = 
0.4346 = p(1-p). Thus p=0.30 or 30%. 
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Our difference-in-differences approach relies on an identifying assumption that the trends 
in outcomes (specifically, the difference in outcomes between the pre- and post-periods) among 
discloser and non-discloser facilities would have been indistinguishable if discloser facilities had 
not committed to self-policing through the Audit Policy’s voluntary disclosure vehicle.  Although 
this assumption cannot be tested, it is more plausible if the two groups had indistinguishable 
trends during the pre-period. A t-test confirmed that our results were not confounded by pre-
existing differences in trends between facilities that were about to disclose and matched non-
disclosing facilities.21  
To assess the risk that mean reversion might be driving our results, we estimated an 
annual treatment effects models. Specifically, we replaced the single voluntarily disclosed 
variable (which estimated the average treatment effect) with a series of dummy variables 
indicating the first year after voluntary disclosure, the second year after voluntary disclosure, and 
so on.  If our main results were driven by mean reversion, we would expect only the first (or 
perhaps the first two) of these annual treatment effects to be negative and large.  The results of 
these annual treatment effect models, reported in Table A1 in the Appendix, provide no evidence 
that our results were driven largely by changes in inspector behavior during the first post-
disclosure year.  Indeed, the results of both of these models indicate that the inspectors’ scrutiny 
declined over time, suggesting that mean reversion is unlikely to be driving our results. 
To assess the extent to which our analysis might be biased by substantive differences in 
observables during the pre-match period between the matched treatment and control facilities, 
we calculated standardized differences (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985) for all of the covariates, 
                                                 
21 We compared self-disclosers’ and non-disclosers’ inspection trends during the two years prior to the match year.  We 
calculated the difference between the number of inspections each facility experienced in the match (disclosure) year and the 
number it experienced two years prior.  A t-test indicated that the two groups had indistinguishable pre-trends (p=0.96).  
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regardless of whether or not they were part of the matching regime.22 The absolute values of the 
standardized differences were below the 20% threshold indicated by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985) for five of the seven covariates. The two covariates whose standardized differences 
exceeded the 20% threshold were the dichotomous variables Compliance Incentive Program 
target and National Priority sector. To assess the extent to which these imbalances might be 
biasing our results, we split the matched sample into two subsamples: (a) those treatment and 
control facilities that had been Compliance Incentive Program targets and/or in National Priority 
sectors during this pre-match period and (b) those treatment and control facilities that had been 
neither Compliance Incentive Program targets nor in National Priority sectors during this pre-
match period. We re-estimated the model on these two subsamples, the results of which 
continued to indicate statistically significant reductions in regulatory scrutiny (= -0.12, p=0.086 
for subsample (a); = -0.24, p<0.01 for subsample (b)). The substantial overlap of the confidence 
intervals for these two estimates23 implies they are statistically indistinguishable, indicating little 
cause for concern that differences in observables are biasing our main results. 
6.2  Regulatory Compliance Records  
We employ conditional fixed-effects logistic regression to estimate the probability that a 
regulatory inspection is “clean”; that is, it reveals no violations.  Recall that this model includes a 
generated regressor because the probability of inspection is a predicted value from a pooled logit 
                                                 
22 We calculated standardized differences pursuant to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) as follows: 
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where TmX  and CmX  represent the sample means of covariate X for the matched treatment facilities and the matched control 
facilities, respectively, during the two years prior to the match (treatment) year. )(XVTr  and )(XVCr  represent the variance of 
covariate X for the entire reservoir of treatment and control facilities (facilities in the entire sampling frame regardless of whether 
or not they were in the matched sample).  
23 The 95% confidence interval was (-0.254, 0.017) for sample (a) and (-0.351, -0.125) for subsample (b).  
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model.  Thus, the block bootstrap standard errors we report here are calculated as a result of a 
sequential two-step estimation process (Cameron and Trivedi 2005: 200; Cameron and Trivedi 
2009: 427) that we implemented as follows.  All observations pertaining to a randomly drawn 
subsample of facilities were used to estimate the pooled logit regression that predicts the 
probability of an inspection occurring that year.  Predicted values generated for this subsample 
were used as a generated regressor in the conditional fixed-effects logistic regression that 
estimates clean inspections.  This procedure was repeated 500 times to generate our results. 
The results indicate that self-reporting a violation and concomitantly committing to self-
policing is associated with improved compliance records.  As indicated in Column 2 of Table 3, 
inspections conducted during the five years subsequent to voluntary disclosure were more than 
twice as likely as pre-disclosure inspections to be “clean” (=0.73; p=0.075; OR=2.08), 
compared to the matched controls over the same time period (Table 3). This effect corresponds 
to a 7.4-percentage-point increase in the probability of a clean inspection from the 84.6% 
baseline to 92.0%.24 
6.2.1. Robustness Tests 
Clustering standard errors by facility yielded results nearly identical to those obtained via 
block bootstrapping, resulting in a more precise estimate (clustered SE=0.38 and p=0.054, 
compared to block bootstrap SE=0.41 and p=0.075). A t-test confirmed that our results were not 
confounded by voluntary disclosers having faster improvement trends during the pre-disclosure 
                                                 
24 The 84.6% baseline is the mean of the dependent variable in this matched sample during the two years prior to the match year 
(0.846). The 92.0% figure refers to the probability (p) calculated based on odds () and odds ratio (OR) as follows. First, convert 
the baseline probability of 0.846 to a baseline odds as =p/(1-p) = 0.846 / (1-0.846) = 5.4935. Second, multiply the result by the 
odds ratio estimate as   OR = 5.4935  2.08= 11.4265. Third, convert the result to a probability as  = p/(1-p) = 11.4265 = 
p(1-p). Thus p=11.4265 /12.4265 = 0.9195  or 92.0 %. 
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period than the matched non-disclosers.25  
Although including predicted probability of inspection subjects this model to the 
possibility of introducing autocorrelation, our results and some additional analysis lead us to 
believe this is unlikely to be driving our results.  First, we note that Table 3 (Column 2) reports 
the coefficient on predicted probability of inspection to be 0.090 (odds ratio=1.09), a magnitude 
close to zero and not statistically significant.  Also, a one-standard-deviation change in predicted 
probability of inspection is associated with a very minor change in the odds of a clean inspection 
of a magnitude very close to a null effect of 1.0.26  Second, we calculated autocorrelation to 
equal -0.03, a value close to zero.  This low value provides no evidence to suspect that 
autocorrelation is significantly influencing our results.  Third, re-estimating the model omitting 
predicted probability of inspection yielded a coefficient on our focal variable voluntarily 
disclosed that was similar in magnitude and significance to our primary model.  Fourth, we re-
estimated the model using Arellano-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) dynamic panel 
data estimation, which is robust to autocorrelation, to estimate both our primary specification 
(including predicted probability of inspection) and the latter alternative model that omitted 
predicted probability of inspection.  Each of these alternative models yielded positive, 
statistically significant coefficients on voluntarily disclosed, which supports our primary results. 
These additional analyses lead us to believe our results are robust to potential autocorrelation.  
To assess the robustness of our results to estimation techniques, we re-estimated the 
model employing a two-stage panel data instrumental variables model to simultaneously estimate 
                                                 
25 We compared self-disclosers’ and non-disclosers’ trends of abnormal releases during the two years prior to the match year.  
For each facility, we calculated the difference between the proportion of inspections that were “clean” in the match (disclosure) 
year and two years prior.  A t-test provided no evidence that the eventual self-disclosers were improving compliance more 
quickly than the matched non-disclosers (p=0.96).  
26 This “very minor change” is calculated as exp( * SD) = exp(0.09 * 0.15) = 1.01, using the predicted probability of inspections 
standard deviation of 0.15 per Panel B of Table 1. 
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the “probability of an inspection” as a first stage and “clean inspection” model as a second stage. 
This model, designed to accommodate continuous rather than our dichotomous variables, also 
yielded a positive, statistically significant coefficient on voluntarily disclosed. 
Another potential concern with our model is that our results might be confounded by 
regression to the mean.  Given our matching technique, our treatment and control facilities share 
the same underlying compliance violation rate in the years prior to the match (disclosure).  If our 
treatment facilities experienced a random negative shock of experiencing an additional violation 
in a given year and this led them to disclose the violation to the Audit Policy, then their apparent 
improvement in compliance in the subsequent year could be interpreted as merely regressing 
back to the mean.  In contrast to this scenario, the results of an alternative model with annual 
treatment effects, reported in Table A2 in the Appendix, indicate that disclosers show 
significantly increased likelihood of clean inspections during later post-disclosure years, which 
suggests that mean reversion is unlikely to be driving our results. 
As above, we assessed the extent to which our analysis might be biased by substantive 
differences in observables during the pre-match period between the matched treatment and 
control facilities by calculating standardized differences for all covariates in the model. For only 
one of the covariates, lagged inspections, did the absolute value of the standardized difference 
exceed the 20% threshold. To test whether this imbalance might be biasing our regression 
results, we trimmed the matched sample to include only matched treatments and controls with 
annual inspection rates during the two-year period prior to the match year that were within the 
95th percentile of the common support; that is, 0, 1, or 2 annual inspections the prior year. The 
absolute value of the standardized differences for all covariates in this trimmed sample fell 
within than the 20% threshold. The results of our regulatory compliance model when estimated 
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for this trimmed sample continued to indicate a statistically significant increase (=0.83, p=0.03, 
OR=2.30) in the probability of a clean inspection following disclosure, with a coefficient 
magnitude very similar our main results. The substantial overlap of the 95% confidence intervals 
on voluntarily disclosed between this estimate (0.07, 1.60) and that of our main result (-0.01, 
1.48) implies that the two estimates are statistically indistinguishable, indicating little cause for 
concern that differences in observables are biasing our main results.  
In light of our earlier finding that regulators reduced the frequency with which they 
inspected self-disclosing facilities, it is possible that when inspectors return to these facilities 
they might inspect less intensively, which could contribute to our finding a reduction in 
compliance violations among self-disclosers. However, our interviews with regulatory inspectors 
provide evidence against a systematic bias in favor of (or against) facilities that disclosed to the 
Audit Policy.  Some inspectors reported that they did not know whether the facilities they 
inspected were voluntary disclosers and those inspectors who did know said that this knowledge 
had no impact on the way they conducted their inspections.  As one inspector noted, “We look at 
everything and it makes no difference one way or the other” (Interview Transcript 5, 2009).  An 
inspector with relatively broad experience inspecting voluntary disclosing facilities stated his 
belief that self-policing produced mixed results that necessitated ongoing scrutiny.  Discussing 
the quality of internal compliance auditing conducted by voluntary disclosing facilities, he said: 
“It really varies.  I’ve seen companies that took it to heart, but it didn’t affect how we inspect 
them, and I’ve seen companies where they say ‘We’re part of all these programs,’ and found a 
lot of violations” (Interview Transcript 1, 2009).  In addition, EPA takes structural precautions 
against inspection bias, strictly segregating its office for voluntary programs from its field 
inspection operations to avoid any actual or apparent conflict of interest.  Thus, although we 
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cannot rule out the possibility that some inspectors might inspect self-disclosers less intensely 
and we highlight this issue to provide context when interpreting our results, our qualitative 
evidence suggests that such a reduction in intensity is neither prevalent nor systematic.  
 
6.3  Abnormal Environmental Releases 
We employ conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression to estimate whether 
facilities’ annual number of abnormal releases declined after voluntarily disclosing and 
committing to self-policing under the Audit Policy.  The results based on the matched sample 
(Column 2 of Table 4) indicate that the expected annual number of abnormal releases declined 
by 20% (=-0.22; p<0.01; IRR=0.80) after facilities voluntarily disclosed to the Audit Policy, 
compared to the matched non-disclosers over the same time period.  This corresponds to a 
decline in abnormal releases per year from the 1.2 baseline to 0.96.27 This 0.24 decline per 
facility-year is equivalent to 120 fewer abnormal releases amongst 100 disclosing facilities over 
a five-year period (calculated as 0.24 releases per facility-year  100 facilities  5 years). 
6.3.1. Robustness Tests 
Our results were very similar when the model was re-estimated using conditional fixed 
effects Poisson regression with robust standard errors clustered by facility. In addition, a t-test 
indicated that the facilities that were about to voluntarily disclose to the Audit Policy and the 
matched non-disclosing facilities had indistinguishable trends in the number of abnormal 
                                                 
27 The 1.2 baseline is the matched sample average during the two years prior to the match year. The 0.96 figure is calculated as 
IRR  baseline rate, or 0.80  1.2. 
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releases during the pre-match period, providing no evidence that this factor confounded our 
results.28  
To assess the potential concern that our results might be driven by regression to the mean, 
we estimated an annual treatment effects model. The results, reported in Table A3 in the 
Appendix, indicate that reductions in abnormal releases during the first post-disclosure year were 
statistically indistinguishable from reductions in subsequent years, which suggests that mean 
reversion is unlikely to be driving our results. 
We also assessed the extent to which our analysis might be biased by substantive 
differences in observables during the pre-match period. In this estimation sample, the absolute 
value of the standardized difference for all covariates fell within the 20% threshold, indicating 
little cause for concern that differences in observables are biasing our main results (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1985). 
 
7. Conclusion 
Our results provide evidence that self-reporting can reliably indicate effectively 
implemented self-policing and that regulators are, in fact, using self-reporting to identify firms 
that are meaningfully monitoring their own operations.  Specifically, we find that regulators 
rewarded voluntary disclosers with inspection relief, suggesting that integrating self-reporting 
into regulatory design can help regulators economize government enforcement resources and 
develop cooperative relationships with committed self-policers.  We also demonstrate that 
                                                 
28 Specifically, we calculated the difference between the number of abnormal releases each facility experienced in the match 
(disclosure) year and the number it experienced in the two prior years.  A t-test indicated that self-disclosers and non-disclosers 
had indistinguishable pre-trends (p=0.37).  We employed this “difference” metric rather than a “percent changes” metric because 
a large proportion of our sample had no abnormal releases in the baseline year and their “percent change” from that period is thus 
undefined.  
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facilities that voluntarily disclosed a violation and committed to self-police under the Audit 
Policy improved their environmental performance by (1) improving their environmental 
compliance records, being cited by regulators for fewer violations than similarly situated non-
disclosers, and (2) reducing their accidental releases of toxic chemicals to the environment.  We 
attribute these results to the design of the Audit Policy, which explicitly links self-reporting to 
self-policing.   
Our findings contribute in four important ways to a literature that some have criticized for 
being “noncommittal on the question of whether voluntary disclosure policies are worthwhile 
complements to conventional enforcement strategies” (Murphy and Stranlund 2008: 261).  First, 
we find evidence that suggests that regulators do, in fact, use self-reporting as a heuristic for 
targeting enforcement resources.  Consistent with studies that find reduced regulatory scrutiny 
for firms that improve toxic pollution levels (Decker 2005) or self-report Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act violations (Stafford 2007), we show that the EPA grants inspection relief to 
voluntary disclosers.  It is important to note that, while they inspect self-reporters at reduced 
rates, regulators do continue to monitor these facilities.  This suggests an attempt on the part of 
the agency to blend responsive and deterrence-based enforcement tools. 
Second, we demonstrate that facilities that committed to self-police as a part of their 
voluntary disclosures to the Audit Policy did, in fact, internally deter harmful behavior by their 
employees.  These findings support Arlen’s (1994) and Arlen and Kraakman’s (1997) argument 
that internal self-policing can contribute to overall deterrence in a given enforcement regime and 
confirm that self-policing can provide enforcement benefits above and beyond those achieved 
through mere self-reporting.   
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Third, we demonstrate that, when self-reports of legal violations are conditioned on a 
commitment to self-police, they can provide a means for regulators to identify facilities that, on 
average, are deterring harmful behavior on the part of their employees.  In a mixed regulatory 
enforcement scheme, regulators must have a means of recognizing effective self-policers in order 
to leverage the deterrent effects achieved at these facilities and reallocate enforcement resources 
toward facilities that are not deterring harmful conduct internally.  Although valid concerns have 
been raised that companies might self-report violations strategically to game the system (Pfaff 
and Sanchirico 2000), our results imply that this concern may be exaggerated, at least within a 
disclosure scheme designed to impose costly risks on gamers.   
Finally, and more broadly, our results suggest the importance of addressing signaling 
issues more explicitly in regulatory design.  To date, the literature on self-policing has focused 
almost exclusively on incentives, discussing how regulators should calibrate rewards and 
penalties to induce firms to police themselves (Arlen and Kraakman 1997; Coglianese and Nash 
2001; Maxwell and Decker 2006; Pfaff and Sanchirico 2000).  Agencies, too, have focused on 
incentives in designing voluntary programs, going to great lengths to reduce the costs29 and 
emphasize the benefits30 of self-policing.  Unfortunately, in their efforts to incentivize 
participation, regulators often strip self-regulatory commitments of any informational value they 
                                                 
29 For example, the EPA promotes its WasteWise program as “free, voluntary, flexible” and makes clear that “[t]he amount of 
time and money you invest is up to you! You are free to set goals that are the most feasible and cost-effective for your 
organization,” which includes the possibility of zero investment beyond completing the brief online registration form (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA WasteWise Program Overview, http://www.epa.gov/wastewise/about/overview.htm 
(updated December 18, 2007; accessed December 31, 2007)). 
30 The EPA, for instance, provides participants in its Performance Track program with “green marketing support,” irrespective of 
the results they ultimately achieve.  This includes, according to a Congressional Committee, “motivational posters; camera-ready 
advertisement “slicks”; press release templates; draft congratulatory letters to be signed by State Governors and other public 
officials; ‘tips’ for communicating with employees, the public, and the media about Performance Track; video and Powerpoint 
presentations; vehicle signs; flags; and event/conference planning” (Letter from the Hon. Albert R. Wynn, Chairman, House 
Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, and the Hon. Bart Stupak, Chairman, House Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, to the Hon. Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA (April 13, 2007)). 
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might have.  Regulators can enhance overall deterrence only if they can identify accurately 
which facilities are policing themselves effectively and can target enforcement resources 
accordingly.  Legal scholarship has begun to explore ways to develop more finely grained 
sorting and targeting systems along these lines.  For instance, Raskolnikov (2009) has proposed a 
tax compliance system that would identify cooperative and normatively motivated taxpayers by 
allowing them to opt into an enforcement regime with terms that would be too costly for gamers 
to accept.  Our findings suggest that self-reporting coupled with a commitment to self-police can 
serve as a valuable starting point for thinking about how to sort regulated firms by their 
compliance capacities and motivations. 
Our findings raise a number of interesting questions for future research.  Although our 
study suggests the possibility of enforcement efficiencies, it does not account for the costs of 
self-policing or the nature of enforcement efficiencies achieved.  A number of studies have 
raised concerns about the high costs and minimal benefits of internal compliance programs 
(Krawiec 2003; Langevoort 2002).  We demonstrate here that self-policing can have real 
deterrence benefits, but future research is necessary to determine whether they are worth the cost 
or whether similar deterrence levels could be achieved at lower cost through government 
enforcement.  It is also important to determine how enforcement resources shifted away from 
voluntary disclosers are being reallocated and whether self-policing is contributing to enhanced 
overall deterrence levels or to reduced enforcement costs.   
Future research could seek to overcome the data limitations that prevented us from 
differentiating the severity of compliance violations that were deterred and calculating the 
attendant avoided social costs.  Future studies should also investigate whether our findings hold 
up in different regulatory and organizational contexts.  It may be that voluntary disclosure has a 
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stronger signaling value in some settings than in others.  It would also be valuable to determine 
whether the signaling value of self-reporting is contingent on a program design that ties it 
explicitly to a commitment to self-police.  Finally, future research could explore other ancillary 
benefits of voluntary disclosure.  For example, prior research has found that voluntarily 
disclosing environmental liabilities can bolster the credibility of other information such firms 
release, which reduces their cost of capital and attenuates negative shocks to stock prices when 
they release bad news (Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Cormier and Magnan 2007).  Researchers 
could investigate whether such benefits also accrue to firms that voluntarily disclose regulatory 
compliance violations.   
With regulators continuing to explore alternative approaches to increasing compliance at 
lower cost, further empirical research is needed to examine the efficacy and efficiency of mixed 
regulatory schemes that combine self-regulation with government enforcement.  Regulators 
eager to engage regulated entities in self-regulation must balance competing needs to design 
programs that will attract participants, withstand legal and procedural challenges, and effectively 
bolster compliance.  Our results suggest that combining self-reporting with a commitment to 
self-police can be a valuable tool for helping to achieve this balance.  
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
PANEL A. Sample for inspection analysis in Table 2 
 
Entire sample 
N=367,776 facility-years
Matched sample 
N=94,270 facility-years 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Annual number of inspections a 0.76 1.01 0 14 0.64 0.79 0 14 
Voluntarily disclosed (dummy) 0.01 0.08 0 1 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Years since prior inspection b 1.94 1.18 1 4 2.08 1.24 1 4 
Number of violations 1 year ago c 0.03 0.18 0 3 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Any enforcement actions 1 year ago (dummy) 0.01 0.10 0 1 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Compliance Incentive Program target (dummy) 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1 
National Priority sector (dummy) 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Log total penalties in the state-year 11.86 4.47 0 17.56 12.44 4.11 0 17.56 
Log number of regulated facilities in the state-year 7.25 0.73 1.61 8.29 7.27 0.71 1.61 8.29 
 
PANEL B.  Sample for compliance analysis in Table 3 
 
PANEL C. Sample for abnormal environmental releases analysis in Table 4 
 
Entire sample 
N=105,092 facility-years 
Matched sample 
N=30,919 facility-years 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Number of abnormal releases a 1.70 3.17 0 17 2.22 3.53 0 17 
Voluntarily disclosed (dummy) 0.02 0.13 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Log production ratio c 0.71 0.22 0 1.79 0.69 0.22 0 1.79 
Log employment 3.78 2.46 0 10.11 3.67 2.34 0 9.90 
Note. In all panels, observations span 1993-2003.  Within the matched sample, observations extend from 2 years prior to 5 years after each facility’s match year. 
a top-coded at 99.9th percentile 
b top-coded at 4 per year 
c top-coded at 99th percentile 
 
Entire sample 
N= 68,411 inspections 
Matched sample 
N=4,174  inspections 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Inspection is “clean” (no violations) (dummy) 0.85 0.35 0 1 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Voluntarily disclosed  (dummy) 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Probability of an inspection this year (predicted) 0.67 0.13 0.21 0.93 0.61 0.15 0.13 0.89 
Number of inspections 1 year ago c 2.24 2.42 0 8 1.40 1.84 0 8 
Number of violations 1 year ago c 0.25 0.60 0 3 0.23 0.57 0 3 
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TABLE 2 
Self-policing is associated with fewer inspections and lower probability of being inspected 
Estimation technique: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression Conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression 
Dependent variable: Any annual inspections Number of annual inspections 
 
(1) 
Entire sample 
(2) 
Matched sample 
(3) 
Entire sample 
(4) 
Matched sample 
 Coefficients Odds ratio Coefficients Odds ratio Coefficients Incident rate 
ratios 
Coefficients Incident rate 
ratios 
Voluntarily disclosed -0.256** 0.77 -0.303** 0.74 -0.053 0.95 -0.185** 0.83 
 [0.082]  [0.114]  [0.037]  [0.052]  
2 years since last inspection 0.170** 1.19 0.372** 1.45 0.032** 1.03 0.126** 1.13 
 [0.011]  [0.023]  [0.005]  [0.011]  
3 years since last inspection 0.282** 1.33 0.537** 1.71 0.064** 1.07 0.231** 1.26 
 [0.016]  [0.031]  [0.009]  [0.018]  
4 or more years since last inspection 0.654** 1.92 1.177** 3.25 0.256** 1.29 0.618** 1.86 
 [0.015]  [0.032]  [0.011]  [0.018]  
Number of violations 1 year ago 0.225** 1.25 0.157* 1.17 0.058** 1.06 0.026 1.03 
 [0.028]  [0.071]  [0.010]  [0.027]  
Number of violations 2 years ago 0.071** 1.07 0.035 1.04 0.005 1.01 -0.010 0.99 
 [0.027]  [0.067]  [0.011]  [0.027]  
Any enforcement actions 1 year ago -0.079+ 0.92 -0.142 0.87 -0.004 1.00 0.002 1.00 
 [0.046]  [0.087]  [0.020]  [0.035]  
Any enforcement actions 2 years ago -0.150** 0.86 -0.185+ 0.83 -0.016 0.98 -0.024 0.98 
 [0.046]  [0.099]  [0.022]  [0.046]  
Compliance Incentive Program target 0.045 1.05 0.049 1.05 0.022+ 1.02 0.049* 1.05 
 [0.027]  [0.045]  [0.013]  [0.020]  
National Priority sector 0.014 1.01 0.282** 1.33 0.031** 1.03 0.102** 1.11 
 [0.018]  [0.034]  [0.009]  [0.020]  
Log total CAA penalties in the state-year 0.021** 1.02 0.013 1.01 0.002 1.002 -0.012** 0.99 
     [0.003]  [0.008]  [0.002]  [0.004]  
Log number of CAA-regulated  1.675** 5.34 1.390** 4.02 0.791** 2.21 0.623** 1.87 
    facilities in the state-year [0.044]  [0.102]  [0.021]  [0.042]  
Facility-level conditional fixed effects Included  Included  Included   Included  
Fixed effects for t years  
    before/after match year 
  Included    Included  
Year fixed effects (1994-2003) Included    Included  Included  
Observations 328,032  82,287  367,776  94,270  
Facilities 42,270  13,673  48,972  16,078  
Wald chi-squared 5688.7**  2782.4**  4616.5**  4733.2**  
Note. Block bootstrap standard errors in brackets (500 replications).  Unit of analysis is the facility-year.  Models 2 and 4 are estimated on the matched sample and include 
matched facilities’ observations starting 2 years prior to their match year through 5 years after the match year.  The conditional fixed-effects logistic regressions (Models 1 and 2) 
omit facilities for which annual inspection rates are either always positive or always zero throughout the sample period. The conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regressions 
(Models 3 and 4) omit facilities that have identical annual inspection rates throughout the sample period.    
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
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TABLE 3 
Self-policing is associated with fewer compliance violations 
 
 
Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression 
Dependent variable: Clean inspection 
 
 (1)  
Entire sample 
(2) 
Matched sample 
 Coefficients Odds ratio Coefficients Odds ratio 
Voluntarily disclosed 0.730+  2.0757 0.733+ 2.08 
 [0.376]  [0.412]  
Probability of an inspection this year (predicted) 0.107  1.1124 0.090 1.09 
 [0.387]  [0.598]  
Number of inspections 1 year ago -0.194** .82383 -0.200** 0.82 
 [0.043]  [0.076] 
Number of inspections 2 years ago -0.134** .8749 -0.134 0.87 
 [0.046]  [0.083] 
Number of violations 1 year ago 1.089**  2.9709 1.182** 3.26 
 [0.123]  [0.224] 
Number of violations 2 years ago 1.129** 3.09395 1.194** 3.30 
 [0.120]  [0.229] 
Facility-level conditional fixed-effects Included  Included 
Year fixed effects (1994-2003)  Included  Included 
Fixed effects for t years before/after match year    Included a 
Observations (Inspections) 11,326  4,174 
Facilities 1,772  713 
Wald Chi squared 257.0***  154.5*** 
 
Note. Block bootstrap standard errors in brackets (500 replications). Unit of analysis is a facility’s 
inspection.  The dependent variable is coded “1” when an inspection resulted in no cited violations and 
“0” when at least one violation was cited.  Model 2 is estimated on the matched sample and includes 
facilities’ observations spanning 2 years prior to the match year through 5 years after the match year.  The 
conditional fixed-effects logistic regression models omit facilities with no variation in the dependent 
variable throughout the sample period, including facilities in our sample that maintained uniform (perfect) 
compliance records during our sample period. Predicted probability of an inspection this year is the 
predicted value from the inspection model specified in Equation (1) estimated with pooled logistic 
regression. 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
a To overcome collinearity with the year fixed effects that prevented the model from converging, we 
merged the dichotomous dummy variables 4 years after match year and 5 years after match year into a 
single dichotomous variable.  
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TABLE 4 
Self-policing is associated with fewer abnormal environmental releases 
  
 
Conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression 
Dependent variable: Number of abnormal releases  
 
 
(1)  
Entire sample 
(2)  
Matched sample 
 
Coefficients Incident rate 
ratio 
Coefficients Incident rate 
ratio 
Voluntarily disclosed -0.169** 0.84 -0.223** 0.80 
 [0.051]  [0.063]  
Log production ratio  0.039+ 1.04 0.011 1.01 
 [0.022]  [0.036]  
Log employment -0.032** 0.97 0.003 1.00 
 [0.008]  [0.014]  
Facility-level conditional fixed-effects  Included  Included  
Year fixed effects (1994-2003) Included  Included  
Fixed effects for t years before/after match year   Included  
Observations 105,092  30,919  
Facilities 13,082  5,582  
Model Wald Chi-squared 12945.0**  4765.7**  
 
Note. Block bootstrap standard errors in brackets (500 replications). The unit of analysis is the facility-
year. These models also include a dummy variable denoting when a missing employment value was 
recoded to zero. These models are estimated only on those facilities that reported data to the EPA’s Toxic 
Release Inventory. Model 2 is estimated on the matched sample and includes matched facilities’ 
observations starting 2 years prior to their match year through 5 years after the match year. The 
conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression models omit facilities that have identical annual 
abnormal release rates throughout the sample period. 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
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Table 5. Comparing results: Entire sample to matched sample 
Voluntarily disclosed coefficients, with 95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Dependent 
variable: 
Any annual inspections 
 
Number of annual 
inspections 
Clean inspection  
 
Number of 
abnormal releases  
Entire sample Table 2, Model 1 
 
-0.26 
[-0.42, -0.10] 
 
Table 2, Model 3 
 
-0.05 
[-0.13, 0.02] 
 
Table 3, Model 1 
 
0.73  
[-0.01, 1.47] 
 
Table 2, Model 1 
 
-0.17 
[-0.27, 0.07] 
Matched sample Table 2, Model 2 
 
-0.30 
[-0.53, -0.08] 
Table 2, Model 4 
 
-0.18 
  [-0.29, -0.08] 
Table 3, Model 2 
 
0.73 
[-0.07,1.54] 
Table 4, Model 2 
 
-0.22 
[-0.35, -0.10]  
 
 55
APPENDIX  
Table A1. Inspection frequency annual treatment effect models 
 
  (1) (2) 
 Estimation technique: Conditional fixed-effects  
logistic regression 
Conditional fixed-effects 
negative binomial regression 
 Dependent variable: Any annual inspections Number of annual inspections
  Matched sample Matched sample 
  Coefficients Odds ratio Coefficients Incident rate 
ratios 
T1 1st year after voluntarily disclosed 0.081 1.08 -0.039 0.96 
  [0.115]  [0.058]  
T2 2nd year after voluntarily disclosed -0.191 0.83 -0.107+ 0.90 
  [0.145]  [0.064]  
T3 3rd year after voluntarily disclosed -0.609** 0.54 -0.232** 0.79 
  [0.165]  [0.068]  
T45 4th and 5th year after voluntarily disclosed -0.854** 0.43 -0.393** 0.68 
  [0.209]  [0.076]  
 2 years since last inspection 0.372** 1.45 0.126** 1.13 
  [0.022]  [0.013]  
 3 years since last inspection 0.539** 1.71 0.232** 1.26 
  [0.029]  [0.020]  
 4 or more years since last inspection 1.180** 3.25 0.619** 1.86 
  [0.029]  [0.018]  
 Number of violations 1 year ago 0.159* 1.17 0.026 1.03 
  [0.065]  [0.026]  
 Number of violations 2 years ago 0.031 1.03 -0.010 0.99 
  [0.063]  [0.028]  
 Any enforcement actions 1 year ago -0.230** 0.79 -0.036 0.96 
  [0.082]  [0.039]  
 Any enforcement actions 2 years ago -0.177* 0.84 -0.033 0.97 
  [0.089]  [0.042]  
 Compliance Incentive Program target 0.051 1.05 0.050* 1.05 
  [0.040]  [0.021]  
 National Priority sector 0.280** 1.32 0.101** 1.11 
  [0.033]  0.017]  
 Log total CAA penalties in the state-year 0.013+ 1.01 -0.012** 0.99 
      [0.008]  [0.005]  
 Log number of CAA-regulated  1.385** 4.00 0.624** 1.87 
     facilities in the state-year [0.095]  [0.046]  
 Facility-level conditional fixed effects Included  Included  
 Fixed effects for t years  
    before/after match year 
Included  Included  
 Year fixed effects (1994-2003)   Included  
 Observations 82,287  94,270  
 Facilities 13,673  16,078  
 Wald chi-squared 3058.7**  4134.7**  
 Wald tests of indistinguishable coefficients:
    
 
T1 = T2: 
T1 = T3: 
T1 = T45:
χ2=3.26+ 
χ2=16.97** 
χ2=18.15** 
T1 = T2: 
T1 = T3: 
T1 = T45: 
χ2=0.89 
χ2=6.25* 
χ2=17.62** 
Note. Brackets contain standard errors, clustered by facility in Model 1. See notes to Table 2. Compare results to 
inspection frequency average treatment effect models reported in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2. 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
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Table A2. Regulatory compliance annual treatment effect model  
 
Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression 
Dependent variable: Clean inspection 
  Matched sample 
  Coefficient Odds ratio 
T1 1st year after voluntarily disclosed 0.248 1.29 
  [0.347]  
T2 2nd year after voluntarily disclosed 0.459 1.59 
  [0.457]  
T3 3rd year after voluntarily disclosed 1.541* 4.70 
  [0.754]  
T45 4th and 5th year after voluntarily disclosed 2.766** 15.98 
  [1.002]  
 Probability of an inspection (predicted) 0.242 1.29 
  [0.584]  
 Number of inspections 1 year ago -0.231** 0.79 
  [0.075]  
 Number of inspections 2 years ago -0.122 0.88 
  [0.076]  
 Number of violations 1 year ago 1.201** 3.32 
  [0.203]  
 Number of violations 2 years ago 1.208** 3.34 
  [0.203]  
 Facility-level conditional fixed-effects  Included  
 Fixed effects for t years before/after match year Included a  
 Fixed effects for two-year periods (1994/5-2002/3) Included  
 Observations (inspections) 4174  
 Facilities 713  
 Wald chi-squared 158.9**  
 Wald tests of indistinguishable coefficients: 
    
 
T1 = T2: 
T1 = T3: 
T1 = T45: 
χ2=0.23 
χ2=2.92+ 
χ2=6.47* 
  
Note. Brackets contain standard errors clustered by facility. See notes to Table 3. Compare results to 
regulatory compliance average treatment effect model reported in Column 2 of Table 3. 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
a To overcome collinearity with the year fixed effects that prevented the model from converging, we 
merged the dichotomous dummy variables 4 years after match year and 5 years after match year into a 
single dichotomous variable.  
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Table A3. Abnormal release annual treatment effect model 
 
Conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression 
Dependent Variable: Number of abnormal releases  
 
 Matched sample 
 
 
Coefficients Incident rate 
ratio 
T1 1st year after voluntarily disclosed -0.208** 0.81 
  [0.060]  
T2 2nd year after voluntarily disclosed -0.199** 0.82 
  [0.061]  
T3 3rd year after voluntarily disclosed -0.274** 0.76 
  [0.068]  
T45 4th and 5th year after voluntarily disclosed -0.261** 0.77 
  [0.07]  
 Log production ratio  0.011 1.01 
  [0.033]  
 Log employment 0.002 1.00 
  [0.010]  
 Facility-level conditional fixed-effects  Included  
 Year fixed effects (1994-2003) Included  
 Fixed effects for t years before/after match year Included  
 Observations 30,919  
 Facilities 5,582  
 Model Wald Chi-squared 9811.7**  
 Wald tests of indistinguishable coefficients: 
 
T1 = T2: 
T1 = T3: 
T1 = T45:
χ2=0.01 
χ2=0.76 
χ2=0.39 
 
Note. Brackets contain standard errors. See notes to Table 4. Compare results to abnormal release 
average treatment effect model reported in Column 2 of Table 4. 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
